Abstract-The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium. However, in some situations, typically involving symmetry breaking, non-uniqueness of solutions is an essential feature. To investigate the nature of non-unique solutions, this paper focuses on the technically simple setting where players have one of two states, with continuous time dynamics, and the game is symmetric in the players, and players are restricted to using Markov strategies. All the mean field game Nash equilibria are identified for a symmetric follow the crowd game. Such equilibria correspond to symmetric -Nash Markov equilibria for N players with converging to zero as N goes to infinity.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
The theory of mean field games was initiated independently by Huang, Caines, and Malhamé [4] and Lasry and Lions [5] . The setting of Huang et al. is linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control and the setting of Lasry and Lions is continuous state Markov diffusion processes. The work of Gomes, Mohr, and Souza [3] translates much of the theory of [5] into the context of continuous time finite state Markov processes. The LQG and finite state settings are technically simpler than the setting of continuous state Markov processes. All three of these works impose assumptions implying uniqueness of solutions to the mean field game equations.
The paper [4] establishes -Nash equilibrium properties for strategy profiles consisting of the decentralized individual control laws that result as responses to the collective mass trajectory. Condition H1 of [4] is a key to guaranteeing uniqueness of the mean field equations, In particular, for the other parameters fixed, the value of r in the term for control cost, ru 2 , should not be too small. In essence, condition H1 restricts the level of coupling among the players. The mean field game (MFG) equations are expressed as a fixed point of an operator T in [4] . Proposition 4.5 of [4] states that the fixed point for T is globally attracting under condition H1 in the paper. Section VI of [4] illustrates a cost gap between individual and global based controls. This is an example of the fact that the social welfare at a Nash equilibrium in game theory does not need to equal the maximum social welfare achievable if the players were to cooperate. The paper [3] studies the continuous-time, finite state version of mean field game theory. Assumption 3, p. 110, gives a monotonicity condition that ensures uniqueness of solutions to the mean field game equations. Proposition 4 of [3] , on the existence of a mean field game Nash equilibrium is proved by using Brouwer's fixed point theorem applied to the map θ → ξ(θ), which is analogous to the map T of [4] . The domain of ξ is the set F of uniformly Lipschitz continuous functions on the interval [0, T ].
In contrast, multiple solutions of the mean field equations naturally arise in [7] , where synchronization of coupled oscillators requires solutions that depart from the incoherence solution. The setup is similar to the discretestate setting we consider in that it is in continuous time, the players are coupled through their running costs, and players can take actions depending on their own states and on the states of the other players. But the setup in [7] is different in that the state space is continuous -specifically it is the unit circle, and the focus is on infinite horizon average cost. The running cost for player
, is join the crowd type; it is smaller if the states are closer together. It is similar to flocking of birds or synchronization of fireflies. The separate Brownian motions of different players tend to make them drift apart, and it requires cost for them to try to stick together. If the coefficient R for the cost is large enough it is not worth the players trying to stick close together, and for the MFG limit they will stay uniformly distributed over the circle (i.e. the incoherence solution). As R crosses below some critical value R c , the incoherence solution still exists but it becomes unstable and additional solutions appear. We find an equivalent phenomena for the simpler discrete
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Some of the same issues addressed in this paper are addressed in a different way in [1] .
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The model we adopt is almost a special case of the model of [4] . We consider N + 1 players with each having state space {0, 1}. The state (i(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) of a given player evolves as a controlled Markov process with predictable control α t , such that the jump probabilities of the state process are given by
for h > 0. The parameter η ≥ 0 represents a background jump rate, so if η > 0 then the process has minimum jump rate η. The background jumping is similar in spirit to the Brownian motions that work against coherence of the coupled oscillators in [7] . The objective function of the reference player is to select (α t ) to solve
where θ t is the fraction of other players in state 0 at time t. The running costs are assumed to have the form c(i, θ, α) = f (i, θ) + α 2 2 , such that the residence costs per unit time, f (0, θ) and f (1, θ), and terminal costs, ψ(0, θ), ψ(1, θ), are all bounded, and uniformly Lipschitz continuous in θ. a) Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation for N + 1 player system: A state feedback control for a given player is a nonnegative function (α(i, n, t)) such that i ∈ {0, 1} represents the current state of the player, n ∈ {0, . . . , N } represents the number of other player in state 0, and t ∈ [0, T ]. Suppose the reference player uses a state feedback control (α(i, n, t)), and the other N players use state feedback control (β(i, n, t)). Then (i(t), n(t)) 0≤t≤T forms a controlled Markov process on {0, 1} × {0, 1, . . . , N }, where i(t) represents the state of the reference player and n(t) represents the number of other players in state 0. The transition rates are as follows:
1 If j = i then i itself is one of the "other players" for player j.
Denote the cost-to-go function for the reference player by u(i, n, t). The HJB equations for it are:
where the corresponding control policy is
The HJB equations (1)- (3) can be viewed in two different ways.
• For policy β of the other N players fixed, (1) - (3) determine the best response policy for the reference player. i.e. α * = BR(β).
• To find a symmetric Nash equilibrium, replace α(·, ·, t) and β(·, ·, t) by α * (·, ·, t) in the definition of γ ± and (1)- (3). This yields a 2(N + 1) dimensional ode with terminal boundary condition and Lipschitz continuous right hand side that uniquely determines the functions (u(i, n, t)) and, hence also, the feedback control law α * . The strategy profile such that all N + 1 players use α * is a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium, because α * is determined backwards from the terminal condition yielding a best response for any interval of the form [t, T ]. Moreover, the Markov perfect equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium among all Markov type (i.e. state feedback) strategy profiles, because the similar HJB equations for a more detailed model description with state space {0, 1}
N +1 still has a unique solution and it is necessarily invariant under permutation of the players. b) Mean field game equilibria and map: A mean field game Nash equilibrium for the finite horizon problem with initial value θ is any solution (θ t , u(i, t)) to the following equations.
Note that the boundary conditions (6) include both initial and terminal values. The mean field equations (4)- (6) can be written as a fixed point equation, θ = T (θ), where T maps a collective mass trajectory (θ t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) to another trajectory. It is determined by first computing the decentralized individual control laws for the players. Then by the uniform law of large numbers [2] , if each of the players follows the same decentralized individual control law, their state processes will be independent and the empirical average of such processes will converge to an expected θ that is the output collective mass trajectory. More concretely, T (θ) is defined as follows. First, costto-go functions (u(i, t)) are determined by the HJB terminal value problem for a single player, in response to the collective mass trajectory θ.
Then θ t , the probability a single player using the decentralized state-feedback control α t (i, t) = (u(i, t)−u(1− i, t)) + is in state 0 at time t, is determined by the initial value problem (Kolmogorov forward equation):
Motivated by the law of large numbers, θ is defined to be the new collective mass trajectory, i.e. θ = T (θ).
The mean field game equations (4) and (5), with the addition of an average cost per unit time term κ on the right-hand side of (5) correspond to an infinite horizon game for average cost per unit time. (See [3] , Section 2.12, p. 117.) In that case the value functions u(i, t) represent realative cost to go. The boundary conditions (6) are replaced by the condition that θ be constant in time or be periodic.
c) Fluid limits of Markov perfect equilibrium: As noted in the introduction, there can be multiple mean field game Nash equilibria, even for a finite horizon problem with given boundary conditions. A mean field game Nash equilibrium (θ t , u(i, t)) yields a decentralized player strategy α t (i, t) = (u(i, t) − u(1 − i, t)) + . For finite N , the strategy profile such that every player uses (α t (i, t)) is easily seen to be an -Nash equilibria such that → 0 as N → ∞. For details see the appendix of the full version of this paper. 3 However, for finite N there is a unique Markov perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profile, so for a given initial condition, the distribution of the finite N system is 3 See full version at arXiv.org. 
Proposition 1. Suppose η > 0. An FLMP trajectory is a mean field game Nash equilibrium.
See the full version of this paper for a proof.
d) Contributions of the paper: Proposition 1 is new and its proof extends to the general setting of [3] . It shows that the search for FLMP trajectories can be limited to the mean field game Nash equilibria. The next contribution of this paper is to identify all of the MFG equilibria for a natural special case of the two state model called follow the crowd. This model is analogous to the model of synchronization of oscillators game [7] , but considerably simpler, so we can identify the finite horizon solutions as well as the infinite horizon ones. The third contribution is to offer the following conjecture, and give evidence for it: Conjecture 1. The FLMP trajectories are the stable fixed points of the MFG mapping T .
A similar type of conjecture is implicit in [7] based on a notion of stability for constant, long-term average cost infinite horizon solutions, called linear asymptotic stability. The paper [7] identifies the critical cost threshold at which the incoherence solution becomes unstable. In addition to giving evidence for Conjecture 1 in the setting of finite horizon games, we also show that the results of [7] for constant, long-term average cost infinite horizon solutions, carry over to the setting of two state Markov processes. For the infinite horizon framework, we show asymptotic stability of certain fixed points for the nonlinear dynamics in Section III-C, and an appendix in the full version of this paper gives an analysis based on the notion of linear asymptotic stability introduced in [7] . Additional results are given in the appendix of the full version of this paper, including, for contrast, a similar analysis for an avoid the crowd model with unique mean field game solutions, and a description of a partial differential equation (PDE) (given for more general model in [3] ) that can be considered to be an extension of the notion of mean field game. 3
III. MFG EQUILIBRIA FOR FOLLOW THE CROWD
The follow the crowd model corresponds to the following cost per time spent in state i:
In particular, if θ > 1/2 (more than half of the other players in state 0), then state 0 has smaller cost per unit time than state 1.
Letting y = u 1 −u 0 , x = 2θ−1, the mean field equations (4)- (6) can be written as:
with the boundary conditions x 0 = 2θ − 1 and y T = ψ 1,
. Once a solution (x, y) to (10) is found for the finite horizon problem over [0, T ], a corresponding solution (u 0 , u 1 , θ) to the mean field game equations can be found by simply integrating (4)- (5) because the righthand sides of (4)- (5) are determined by (x t , y t ).
A useful fact is that the equations (10) form a Hamiltonian system, for the Hamiltonian function H:
In other words, (10) has the formẋ = H y andẏ = −H x , where H x and H y represent partial derivatives of H. Consequently, the value of H is constant along the solutions of (10), because Contour maps of H are shown in Fig. 1 for various values of η. For small values of x, y the quadratic terms in H dominate the cubic term, and for η < 1/2, constant x 2 − 4ηxy + y 2 gives elliptical orbits of x, y, in the clockwise direction.
A. Finite time horizon mean MFG solutions
For the finite horizon mean field game with zero terminal cost (i.e. terminal boundary condition y T = 0), and initial state x 0 = 0, correspond to paths that begin on the y axis (so the initial condition x 0 = 0 is satisfied) and end on the x axis. One solution is (x t , y t ) ≡ (0, 0) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. Let φ = arctan If η < 1/2 thenφ < 0 for (x, y) in a neighborhood of the origin, indicating clockwise movement. Moreover, for φ fixed,φ is an increasing function of the distance of (x, y) to the origin (decreasing angular speed because angular velocity is negative). Thus, the time for (x, y) to traverse a contour across the first quadrant is increasing in y 0 . for y 0 > 0. As y 0 → 0 the dynamics is given, to first order, by the MFG linearized about (0, 0), given bẏ
with solution of the form (setting x 0 = 0 and y 0 > 0):
The time it takes the linear system to traverse the first quadrant is T c (η)
. Hence, as y 0 → 0, the traversal time for the quadrant converges to T c (η). Thus, for η < 1/2 and T ≤ T c (η), (0, 0) is the unique solution to the MFG. For T > T c (η) there is one 4 more solution that remains in, and traverses, the first quadrant, and the negative of that solution remains in, and traverses, the third quadrant. For T large enough there are solutions that traverse contours of H through three quadrants, five quadrants, and so on. A similar radial velocity analysis for the pair (y,ẏ) (see appendix of full version of the paper) establishes that the entire periods of the dynamical system are increasing with amplitude, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . Since the dynamics is symmetric under rotation by π, we conclude that for any odd number k, starting on the positive y axis, the time required to rotate through k quadrants is increasing in the initial condition y 0 . Therefore, as T increases from 0, the number of solutions starts at one and jumps up by two when T crosses times of the form T c + kπ/( 1 − 4η 2 ) for k ≥ 1. Equivalently, the number of solutions is
B. Infinite horizon constant or periodic MFG solutions
The equilibrium points of the dynamics (10) are the critical points of the Hamiltonian function (i.e. ∇H = 0), and are given as follows. If 0 ≤ η < 0.5, (0, 0) is an equilibrium point and there are also exactly two nonzero equilibrium points, given by ±P , where
If η ≥ 0.5, (0, 0) is the unique equilibrium point.
Regarding infinite horizon periodic solutions, examination of H and the equations for angular velocity, (12) and similar equation for angle of (y,ẏ), lead to the following conclusions. If 0 ≤ η < 0.5, there is a two-dimensional family of periodic solutions that can be indexed by the peak amplitude of x (ranges over (0, x)) and phase. The period of the solutions increases continuously over (2π/ 1 − 4η 2 , ∞) as the peak amplitude of x increases over (0, x). If η ≥ 0.5, there are no periodic solutions of (10).
C. Infinite horizon convergent transient MFG solutions, and the asymptotically stable constant solutions
Consider the initial value problem over t ∈ [0, ∞) with some initial condition (x 0 , y 0 ) and dynamics (10). First, suppose 0 ≤ η < 0.5. For any initial condition (x 0 , y 0 ) such that x 0 = 0, one of four cases holds: x t is periodic with a positive period, x converges to P , x converges to −P , or x t exits [−1, 1] in finite time. The following categorize the convergent solutions such that x t remains in [−1, 1].
• For any initial value of x 0 ∈ (−x, x), there exist two corresponding initial values of y 0 such that the solution of the initial value problem satisfies (i) x t ∈ [−1, 1] for all t and (ii) the solution converges to a limit as t → ∞. For the smaller value of y 0 the limit is −P and for the larger value of y 0 the limit is P . The value of the larger y 0 for example is such that the contour of H through (x 0 , y 0 ) contains P .
• For an initial value x 0 ∈ [−1, −x] there exists a unique value of y 0 such that the solution of the initial value problem satisfies x t ∈ [−1, 1] for all t.
That solution converges to −P as t → ∞.
• Similarly, for an initial value x 0 ∈ [x, 1] there exists a unique value of y 0 such that the solution of the initial value problem satisfies x t ∈ [−1, 1] for all t.
That solution converges to P as t → ∞.
Second, suppose η ≥ 0.5. For any x 0 ∈ [−1, 1], there is a unique value of y 0 , such that the solution of the initial value problem for (10) satisfies x t ∈ [−1, 1] for all t. Furthermore, y 0 has the same sign as x 0 , and the solution converges to (0, 0) as t → ∞. The value of y 0 is the root of H(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 (for x 0 fixed) that is closer to zero.
The above observations give a sense in which ±P is an asymptotically stable equilibrium point of the dynamics (10) if 0 ≤ η < 0.5, and (0, 0) is an asymptotically stable equilibrium point if η ≥ 1/2.
IV. EVIDENCE FOR CONJECTURE 1
In order to explore whether Conjecture 1 is true, it is natural to explore two sides of the question. One side is to identify the FLMP trajectories. Numerically that can be done by solving the 2(N + 1) dimensional HJB equation for the system with N + 1 players to find the strategy α * (i, n, t) players use for the Markov perfect equilibrium with N + 1 players, and then either simulating the corresponding occupancy process through Monte Carlo simulation of N + 1 players independently using that policy, or solving the Kolmogorov forward equations to find the marginal distribution, mean and variance of the number of players in state 0 vs. time. 5
The other side is to identify the stable fixed points of T . Two ways to explore which fixed points of T are stable are to either numerically investigate the orbit trajectories as T is repeatedly applied to some initial trajectory, or to examine the linearization of T about a fixed pointthis is the Gateaux derivative and it can be expressed as an integral operator. The eigenvalues can be computed numerically, and in rare cases, analytically. By abuse of notation, we use T to denote the mean field map as a mapping T (x) → x obtained by the change of coordinates x = 2θ − 1. a) Numerical identification of FLMP trajectories: For the symmetric follow the crowd model, numerical analysis strongly and consistently indicates which MFG solutions are FLMP trajectories. We find that for η ≤ 1/2 they coincide with the unique MFG equilibriumnamely, the (0,0) trajectory over [0, T ]. And for η > 1/2 there are two FLMP trajectories. Namely, the one that traverses the first quadrant in the x-y plane once, and the negative of it, which traverses the third quadrant in the xy plane once. In particular, the solutions that wind around the origin through three or more quadrants do not appear to be FLMP solutions. See Fig. 3 for illustration. For less symmetric examples it is less obvious where the bifurcation curve is that separates FLMP solutions that converge to a point closer to 1, or converge to a point closer to 0. The bifurcation curve often coincides with a line or curve of indifference for the N + 1 player game with a large number of players, corresponding to upcrossings of zero by the mapping n → u 1 (0, n, t) − u 0 (0, n, t). This is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
See the full paper for the sections on examination of the orbits of iterates of T . 
